Assessing Toronto's discomforting division lead

Image courtesy of Frank Gunn/The Canadian Press.

"We have far more focus on the road than we do at home, and that is a concern," said Dwane Casey, immediately after the Raptors' recent overtime collapse at home to Charlotte.

That buzzer-beating defeat dropped Toronto to 9-14, with a subpar .333 winning percentage at the Air Canada Centre. Although not welcomed by the team's head coach, this steady mediocrity appeared to have fit neatly with GM Masai Ujiri's desire to overhaul the roster and start afresh.

The slip in the standings, however, preceded a pair of plucky victories on a three-game Southwestern swing. An overtime triumph in Dallas combined with blotting Oklahoma City's 13-0 home record copy book allowed the team to "ascend" to the apex of the historically awful Atlantic Division. These performances formed part of a 5-3 stretch since December 8, following the decision to ship costly wingman Rudy Gay to Sacramento for an assortment of expiring contracts and basketball debris (Greivis Vasquez, Patrick Patterson, John Salmons, and Chuck Hayes).

At first glance, Ujiri's two-pronged reset -- by removing the cap-clogging deals and offensive inefficiencies of Andrea Bargnani and Rudy Gay -- signalled a clear intent to reshape the rotation and prioritise ping-pong balls. Yet the exodus of Gay's 18.6 FGA per game has re-allocated a high volume of used-possessions, with early signs of success. Amir Johnson, for example, has relished Rudy's absence by converting 67.1% of his post-trade field goal attempts and generating a +12.1 per 100 possessions. Meanwhile second-year guard Terrence Ross, the immediate candidate to claim the departed Gay's minutes, has drilled 44.2% of his long range attempts en route to 13.2 points per outing.

Despite a losing record and being beneath the expected Pythagorean win-loss ratio of 13-13, Toronto's overall point differential sits at just -4. This has been padded handsomely by a +21 stretch over the eight games since the seven-player transaction, per NBA.com stats. Symbolic of the mismatched collection of roster-fillers -- and the team's not-so-subtle intention to continue to trade its veteran players -- DeMar DeRozan and Kyle Lowry have logged an average of 38 and 37 minutes per game, respectively, in this window.

The Raptors' willingness to move the remaining vestiges of the Bryan Colangelo era has been in the public forum since (at least) November 1, when ESPN.com's Marc Stein detailed that "Anyone but [Jonas] Valanciunas," is available in trade conversations. The "anyone but" list likely now includes the aforementioned Amir Johnson, whose continued stellar play has seen his value in league circles rise incrementally. Nevertheless, the front office's predetermined philosophical outlook and the team's unexpected status as division leaders has created an intriguing juxtaposition. If the postseason were to begin tomorrow, Toronto would be destined for a top-four seed and home-court advantage in the first-round, something the city has not been treated to since 2007.

Thus, the organisation is left in somewhat of a precarious position. The Atlantic Division, with an aggregate record of 49-70 and a point differential of -577 on the season, may just be atrocious enough that the Raptors could reshuffle their pieces and still earn a playoff berth. Moving Gay has done nothing but make the team better as a whole, and while shipping DeRozan and/or Lowry for future assets may move the needle in the lottery direction, there are no guarantees that it wholly eliminates the team from postseason contention. With Rajon Rondo yet to register a minute of playing time for the Celtics in 2013-14, the Nets' Brook Lopez recently ruled out for the entire season with a broken foot, Philadelphia having failed to win a game in regulation after November 8, and the Knicks playing persistently repugnant basketball, Toronto is situated atop the division standings by near-default. There doesn't appear to be another non-Raptors transaction or organisational shake-up capable of altering the landscape of the Atlantic on the horizon, either.

The Raptors place 15th in the league for +/- per 100 possessions through 26 games at -0.2, and are on the fringes of the NBA's top ten for their defense. Dwane Casey's squad have a Defensive Rating of 101.9, tied with Houston for 10th spot in the rankings. The primary problems for this team, though, emanate from the other side of the ball. So long as DeMar DeRozan continues to source 32.2% of his scoring from the midrange area with a usage rate of 26.6%, the team will carry a limited offensive ceiling. DeRozan is also firing an average of 3.5 trebles per contest, while only connecting on 31.9% of his deep attempts. To further the Raptors' identity quandary, the 6"7 slasher has played well enough to help sustain the team's level of competitiveness, but is perhaps not performing to the extent that his value is skyrocketing in the minds of opposing scouts.

Toronto have thus far confronted the sixth-toughest basketball calendar, with a Strength of Schedule (SOS) mark of .520, according to ESPN's Hollinger statistics. In the context of their winning aspirations, the Raptors begin a home-and-home matchup with New York tonight, while preparing for road tussles with Chicago, Miami, and Indiana in the next ten days.

As the trade deadline approaches and the Raptors push through a raft of Eastern Conference bouts, one can only hope that the black clouds will be removed from above the listless play of the Atlantic Division outfits.

Food for Thought on the NBA's 'Tanking' Debate

Embarking on a season where a handful of teams look hopelessly destined (and content to be so) for the lottery, with zero postseason aspirations, there has been some noteworthy, timely discussion on the subject of 'tanking', being satisfied with losing games, and the now-commonplace method of building through the draft. ESPN's Chad Ford (via ESPN Insider) recently assessed the extent to which he believes teams qualify for the tanking label, throwing the Phoenix Suns and the Philadelphia 76ers atop his "rankings". Ford asserted that the NBA is littered with franchises who "want to lose a lot", based on the knowledge that "NBA GMs are calling the next draft the best in a decade". The chief lottery prizes are anticipated to be Canadian Andrew Wiggins and fellow freshman Kentucky's Julius Randle. League executives may value the talent of this upcoming draft at historic, near unprecedented levels, but with the team who holds the honour of the NBA's worst regular season record only assured of a 25% chance of the #1 overall pick, and so much more (player development, team culture, health, roster balance, coaching etc.) at stake in the game of drafting franchise-altering talent, is the tanking strategy truly worthwhile?

Forward-thinking, forthright Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban expressed his opinion on the matter of team-building, and just how the Mavs have approached the issue under his guidance. Cuban addressed the idea of allowing your team to "lose a lot of games so you have a chance to pick the next Kevin Durant, John Wall or Kyrie Irving or Blake Griffin et al", while reminding his audience that the formula cannot be that simple - there remains the inherent need for the players to develop, and for them to be appropriately surrounded by a supporting cast capable of contending for a championship. Interestingly, the Mavericks' owner also raised the prospect of many teams following a model, or a set strategy, and that, on the flip side, "it creates opportunities for those who have followed a different path". Cuban's views are, as usual, candid and worth considering, and raise further questions about the finality, certainty, or lack thereof, within the NBA's contemporary managerial manifesto.

A recent example of executive decision-making that remains relevant to this discussion is the Orlando Magic's decision to trade Dwight Howard prior to his contract expiring, and the talent level that the franchise received in return. Orlando flatly rejected the chance at receiving either of former All-Stars Andre Iguodala and Andrew Bynum, raising suspicions that Magic GM Rob Hennigan intentionally received an underwhelming (short-term) offer with the hope of improving the team's draft position. In the wake of the transaction, the Magic were widely projected to be the 'losers' of the trade, headed for a certain regression in the win column. A collection of All-Stars switched jerseys and Orlando held the desired commodity and centrepiece of the discussions, yet the organisation's returns consisted primarily of inexperienced young players, rookie, and future assets. All three major pieces of the deal (not arriving in Orlando) - Dwight Howard, Andrew Bynum, and Andre Iguodala - have since departed their trade destinations, significantly altering any forecasts associated to the original agreement. Orlando finished 2012-13 with a league-worst record of 20-62, subsequently earning the 2nd overall selection in the draft and taking Indiana guard Victor Oladipo with the pick.

Dave Berri of Freakanomics.com analysed the historical outcomes of repeated losing seasons and high draft placements, setting the bar for basketball ineptitude at 25 wins or fewer. Berri reviewed the win totals of those teams in the years after their subpar seasons, revealing that "nearly 90 percent of teams that win 25 games or fewer are not contenders five years later". The piece discusses the trend of teams attempting to avoid the "mediocrity treadmill", while debunking myths that the NBA's draft lottery is starting place on the championship map, and concluding that "losing is not a winning strategy in the NBA". Berri's discussion also raised the prospect of teams lodged in the window of 34 to 49 wins in any given season (labelled "mediocre" for the purposes of his piece) are better placed than those who are wholeheartedly embracing the race to the bottom.

Another, different perspective on the subject emerged courtesy of Charlotte Bobcats owner Michael Jordan, who also refuted the idea of tanking, and insisted that his franchise would not be taking that route. Jordan clarified his thoughts on the tanking model, declaring, "If that was my intention I never would have paid Al Jefferson $13 million a year." The Bobcats, lost in the abyss of NBA irrelevance and holders of a 62-168 win-loss ratio in Jordan's three seasons as owner, are desperate to shed the label of being perennially incompetent, and would seemingly welcome a season in the range of 34 to 49 wins, to use Berri's scale.

With so much speculation and anticipation hovering over the 2014 NBA Draft and the potential prospects, this season is bound to prove an exhibition in team management, and team building strategy.