Food for Thought on the NBA's 'Tanking' Debate

Embarking on a season where a handful of teams look hopelessly destined (and content to be so) for the lottery, with zero postseason aspirations, there has been some noteworthy, timely discussion on the subject of 'tanking', being satisfied with losing games, and the now-commonplace method of building through the draft. ESPN's Chad Ford (via ESPN Insider) recently assessed the extent to which he believes teams qualify for the tanking label, throwing the Phoenix Suns and the Philadelphia 76ers atop his "rankings". Ford asserted that the NBA is littered with franchises who "want to lose a lot", based on the knowledge that "NBA GMs are calling the next draft the best in a decade". The chief lottery prizes are anticipated to be Canadian Andrew Wiggins and fellow freshman Kentucky's Julius Randle. League executives may value the talent of this upcoming draft at historic, near unprecedented levels, but with the team who holds the honour of the NBA's worst regular season record only assured of a 25% chance of the #1 overall pick, and so much more (player development, team culture, health, roster balance, coaching etc.) at stake in the game of drafting franchise-altering talent, is the tanking strategy truly worthwhile?

Forward-thinking, forthright Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban expressed his opinion on the matter of team-building, and just how the Mavs have approached the issue under his guidance. Cuban addressed the idea of allowing your team to "lose a lot of games so you have a chance to pick the next Kevin Durant, John Wall or Kyrie Irving or Blake Griffin et al", while reminding his audience that the formula cannot be that simple - there remains the inherent need for the players to develop, and for them to be appropriately surrounded by a supporting cast capable of contending for a championship. Interestingly, the Mavericks' owner also raised the prospect of many teams following a model, or a set strategy, and that, on the flip side, "it creates opportunities for those who have followed a different path". Cuban's views are, as usual, candid and worth considering, and raise further questions about the finality, certainty, or lack thereof, within the NBA's contemporary managerial manifesto.

A recent example of executive decision-making that remains relevant to this discussion is the Orlando Magic's decision to trade Dwight Howard prior to his contract expiring, and the talent level that the franchise received in return. Orlando flatly rejected the chance at receiving either of former All-Stars Andre Iguodala and Andrew Bynum, raising suspicions that Magic GM Rob Hennigan intentionally received an underwhelming (short-term) offer with the hope of improving the team's draft position. In the wake of the transaction, the Magic were widely projected to be the 'losers' of the trade, headed for a certain regression in the win column. A collection of All-Stars switched jerseys and Orlando held the desired commodity and centrepiece of the discussions, yet the organisation's returns consisted primarily of inexperienced young players, rookie, and future assets. All three major pieces of the deal (not arriving in Orlando) - Dwight Howard, Andrew Bynum, and Andre Iguodala - have since departed their trade destinations, significantly altering any forecasts associated to the original agreement. Orlando finished 2012-13 with a league-worst record of 20-62, subsequently earning the 2nd overall selection in the draft and taking Indiana guard Victor Oladipo with the pick.

Dave Berri of Freakanomics.com analysed the historical outcomes of repeated losing seasons and high draft placements, setting the bar for basketball ineptitude at 25 wins or fewer. Berri reviewed the win totals of those teams in the years after their subpar seasons, revealing that "nearly 90 percent of teams that win 25 games or fewer are not contenders five years later". The piece discusses the trend of teams attempting to avoid the "mediocrity treadmill", while debunking myths that the NBA's draft lottery is starting place on the championship map, and concluding that "losing is not a winning strategy in the NBA". Berri's discussion also raised the prospect of teams lodged in the window of 34 to 49 wins in any given season (labelled "mediocre" for the purposes of his piece) are better placed than those who are wholeheartedly embracing the race to the bottom.

Another, different perspective on the subject emerged courtesy of Charlotte Bobcats owner Michael Jordan, who also refuted the idea of tanking, and insisted that his franchise would not be taking that route. Jordan clarified his thoughts on the tanking model, declaring, "If that was my intention I never would have paid Al Jefferson $13 million a year." The Bobcats, lost in the abyss of NBA irrelevance and holders of a 62-168 win-loss ratio in Jordan's three seasons as owner, are desperate to shed the label of being perennially incompetent, and would seemingly welcome a season in the range of 34 to 49 wins, to use Berri's scale.

With so much speculation and anticipation hovering over the 2014 NBA Draft and the potential prospects, this season is bound to prove an exhibition in team management, and team building strategy.

'You have six NBA players' - All is Not Well in the City of Brotherly Love

Sixers head coach Brett Brown pondering a season of headaches.

Prior to the team's recent preseason loss at the hands of Cleveland in Columbus, Ohio, incoming head coach Brett Brown offered an honest, foreboding assessment of the status of 76ers basketball, confessing that Philadelphia are blessed with the fortunes of just six legitimate, capable, NBA-calibre players. This explicit denigration of the quality of the roster emerged from a series of comments by Brown, and was not to be lost among the sombre revelation that the first-time coach, and the organisation, do not anticipate highly-touted rookie and #6 pick in this year's draft - Kentucky product Nerlens Noel - to appear at all in the upcoming campaign. Noel, the deeply scrutinised big man who (prior to June's NBA Draft) had long remained in the conversation as a possible #1 overall selection, despite suffering a torn ACL in his left knee in February, joined the franchise as a lone, flickering beacon of light and prosperity on an otherwise disjointed, lacking squad with gaping holes and ill-conceived contractual negotiations. The Sixers' new regime unashamedly ushered in wholesale changes to the team in acquiring the injured Noel, and hitting the restart button by sending All-Star point guard Jrue Holiday to New Orleans, receiving the nimble Kentucky centre and the Pelicans' protected 2014 first round pick in return. All of this shuffling and reshaping, it should be mentioned, occurred well prior to the appointment of Brett Brown as the man in charge. The fact that the organisation withstood a span from April to August without an official head coach is ominously reflective of the state of affairs.

Brown takes the reigns of this undisputed mess following 11 seasons on the San Antonio sidelines, as a recent inductee of the New England Basketball Hall of Fame, and with a four year stint as head coach of the Australian national team under his belt that saw them place 7th at the 2012 London Olympics. Wisely, Brown protected himself and assured stability and job security by insisting upon a lengthy four year contract, displaying a clear awareness of the basketball debris that burdens his new roster. He enters the fray in the midst of discussions and expert opinion that place these 76ers in contention to break the franchise's own mark for the worst 82-game record in NBA history, an unenviable task, to say the least. The declaration that Noel is unlikely to play a part at all in the team's 2013-14 schedule evokes horrific memories for a fan base that endured a treacherous run with the costly, broken down Andrew Bynum, who failed to register a single minute in a Sixer uniform last season, and does little to discredit this level of doom-and-gloom conversation.

With the regular season fast-approaching, Philadelphia figures to put forth a starting crew 'headlined' by holdovers Thaddeus Young, Evan Turner, and Spencer Hawes, a trio responsible for middling, subdued results when sharing substantial minutes together. As lineup regulars in recent seasons, the Turner-Young-Hawes combination appeared in a considerable sample size of 74 regular season outings in 2012-13, managing a meagre +/- of +0.1 points per 100 possessions, per NBA.com stats. This, if anything, is a harsh truth for Brown and illustrative of what he will have to work with in his inaugural season on the job. Brown will struggle mightily to address the barren offensive output overseen by Doug Collins, which was good for a placement of 30th in the league rankings, with an average of 93.2 points per game, also per NBA.com. The Sixers were able to move the ball relatively freely and establish themselves in the assists department, nevertheless, dishing out 22.8 helpers per game - good for 11th in the league - whilst limiting their turnovers to an honest 13.0 per contest, 2nd best in the Association. Their ability to share, value, and manage the basketball almost certainly followed budding star Jrue Holiday out the door, however. In addition to this, spacing and opposing defense's packing the paint is destined to plague the Sixers play, at least until they attempt to address the shallowness of their outside shooting.

Philadelphia guard Evan Turner's 2012-13 shot chart (where yellow represents league-average, green above-average, and red below-average), courtesy of NBA.com/stats.

Neither Evan Turner nor Thaddeus Young holds the capability to wilfully and/or adequately stretch the floor, with Turner hovering either at or below league-average from all areas behind the three-point line, while of Young's negligible eight tries from beyond-the-arc, he cashed in on only a solitary attempt. These facts, in congruence with Spencer Hawes' admirable gunslinging attitude from the outside and the ongoing knee troubles of reliable veteran Jason Richardson, seem a certain formula for an overcrowded frontline and an inefficiently orchestrated offense. Hawes, despite an obvious willingness to lurk on the perimeter, nailed a melancholy 31% of his 19 hoists from the left-wing, and didn't serve any better on the opposing side of the floor, hitting just 1 of 11. Unquestionably, this does not bode well for Brown or the 76ers, and has the makings of a paltry, below-average scheme, even before one considers the plethora of minutes likely to be handed to incumbent starting point guard Michael Carter-Williams, who netted an eye-gauging 39.8% of his field goals over a 66-game career at Syracuse. Carter-Williams launched a disproportionate 137 long balls over that same span, sinking an uninspiring 42 of them.

How Brown elects to distribute and balance minutes over the course of the season will auger an influence on the team's offensive mould to an extent, yet he more than anyone, though, will be aware of the scarce pickings on hand. Assuredly, Brown will look to accommodate the poor shooting prowess of the roster by allocating starter's minutes to fourth year guard James Anderson, a guard who has nailed 39.1% of his shots from downtown in sporadic time with San Antonio and Houston. The material outcome of this kind of dependence on Anderson will prove a learning curve for both player and coach, alike. Where Brown will not receive any production is from former lottery pick Royce White, previously of the Houston Rockets, whom the Sixers discarded this past week, having only traded for him in July. Philadelphia holds the dubious honour of being the second NBA team to give up on White, the individual who is yet to log any regular season minutes.

Brett Brown will head into Wednesday's opener at home to Miami hoping to complement his likely starters of Carter-Williams, Anderson, Turner, Young, and Hawes, with some form of bench concoction consisting of fourth year big Lavoy Allen, combo guard Tony Wroten, and relative NBA no-names Daniel Orton and Hollis Thompson. Philly will exhibit an ironically thin lineup for an organisation desperately pining for the enthusiasm of a city and a disenchanted fan base, emblazoning the team arena, merchandise and neighbourhoods with the ambiguous motto of 'Together We Build'. Cynicism aside, it will be interesting to the NBA junkie to observe how the faultlessly-honest Brown seeks to massage the veritable mess of a roster at his disposal, and just how low the squad will sink into the muddy waters of the perennial 'tanking' discussions.

Image courtesy of nba.com/sixers.

Don't despair, Sixer fans, together we build.

UPDATE: Ernie Grunfeld & the Washington Professional Basketball Team Liked My Suggestion

Ernie Grunfeld, Washington Wizards General Manager and orchestrator of the awful, awful trade that sent 2009 #5 draft pick (later Ricky Rubio) to Minnesota in exchange for Randy Foye and Mike Miller, took notice of Prophecies from the Parquet's idea and acted quickly. Grunfeld, sensing the pressure and need for a playoff push, moved to bring Phoenix Suns centre Marcin Gortat to D.C., in exchange for Emeka Okafor and his expiring contract. Typically, this may pass as a relatively run-of-the-mill NBA transaction where one general manager feeling the heat attempted to move the needle toward a 6th, 7th, or 8th spot in the playoffs. Not so fast. Introducing one of our scheduled, regular features earlier today (Death by Trade Machine), PFP posted at 11:22 Pacific Standard Time that it would be prudent for Washington to move the Okafor contract, and to look no further than Phoenix for a potential trading partner. The purpose of this feature, as mentioned in the breakdown, is not to stand as a foreshadower of future moves or to capitalise on a raft of rumoured deals, but rather to attempt to use logic and come up with reasonable solutions for unbalanced, misdirected, and/or mediocre teams - with the help of the ESPN Trade Machine.

The fact that this took place within hours of the post/suggestion (with SBNation's Drew Garrison posting about the trade at 5:45 EST) is a gigantic coincidence and highly comical, yet it highlights the future value and potential for our staple of player movement ideas and prognostications.

The mechanics of the deal are far from identical, most notably Dragic is not included, with the Suns sending out Gortat, veteran guard Shannon Brown, Malcolm Lee, and second-year guard Kendall Marshall, and receiving Okafor in return. The teams also exchanged future first-round draft picks, of note for a Phoenix team with a view toward what is considered to be a loaded 2014 Draft.

Ultimately, the man in charge of the Wizards - Ernie Grunfeld - will be judged by Washington's ability to reach the postseason, and whether or not the current construct of the team is such that they are positioned for further advancements up the standings.

Keep a close eye on Death by Trade Machine.

'Death by Trade Machine' is a regular feature running on this blog, where PFP contributors teleport themselves into the minds of NBA front offices (through the wonders of the ESPN NBA Trade Machine), and attempt to conjure solutions to the nagging issues of NBA teams. Trade ideas may be centred on team balance, salary cap questions, rumoured player dissatisfaction, or any combination of these factors. NOTE: These posts in no way are intended to serve as forecasts or predictions for future transactions, but rather as a laid back way of indulging in the insanity of NBA player movement.